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2.6
THE MPQNDO REVOLT i960.
X.
SECTION 1 . On;the Causes of the Revolt.
In accounting for the growth of militancy in Eastern Pondoland
in I960, it is necessary to analyse a number of changes enforced
in the reserves by the Government in the 1950's. Most prominent •
of these are the intensification of 'betterment' schemes and the
institution of the Bantu Authorities system of local government.
This section of the paper then, is largely concerned with radical
critique of these two pillars of rural administration.
A central fallacy of much writing on South Africa is that the
reserves are commonly accorded an 'independent' status. While this
is most explicitly expressed in pro-Apartheid publications, the
approach is equally prominent as an implicit assumption of much
liberal writing. In particular the 'dual economy1 thesis employed
for example, by Professor D. Hobart Houghton (1) and A. P. Walshe
must be mentioned. To quote the latter :
'The reserves, occupying approximately 13 per cent of
the geographical area of South Africa but about 20 per
cent of what is potentially the best agricultural land,
display a decaying subsistence agriculture.
Scattered across the map, they were established where
the southward-moving tribes were defeated and confined
by the Boers and British. In this new environment, where
there was only a fixed supply of land, the old pastoral
and arable methods, suitable to a system of shifting
agriculture and unlimited land, produced acute soil
erosion accompanied by declining output. The developing
economy based on European initiative eventually came to
provide the only means to an existence above abject
poverty and the only means to the satisfaction of new
wants'. (2)
The decline of the reserves in the twentieth century had, then,
very little connexion with the development of the 'developing
economy1 except insofar as it provided work for those seeking it.
Conversely the development of the capitalist sectors had very
little to do with the decline of the reserves except insofar as
Boers and British 'confined1 the 'southward moving tribes1.
The weaknesses of this position have been convincingly demon-
strated, among others, by Bundy, and Harold Wolpe (3) and therefore
require no great emphasis. It should, however, be mentioned that •••
1. Perhaps the most consistent offender is Professor
D. Hobart Houghton. For a short explication and critique of his
position, see BUNDY, Colin : 'The Emergence and Decline of a South
African Peasantry.' African Affairs Vol. 71 No. 285 pp. 369-388.
Oct. 1972 : esp. pp. 369-370.
2. WALSHE, A:P. !The Changing Content of Apartheid' Review of
Politics, Vol. 25 pp. 343-361, 1963 : p. 344.
3. BUNDY : op cit and WOLPE, Harold : 'Capitalism and Cheap
labour-power in South Africa : From Segregation to Apartheid1
Economy and Society Vol. 1 No. 4 pp. 425-456, Nov. 1972, pp. 432-
437, et passim.
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it fails to grasp the fundamental point that the reserves were created
a.nd maintained not as a result of the 'Kaffir wars" but in response
to (a) African competition in agriculture and (b) a demand for a
particular kind of labour force.
The major interest that imposed itself on African life in the
first half of this century has undoubtedly been that of the demand
for migrant labour for primary capitalist sectors. This demand could
presumably have been met by the creation of rural and urban proletar-
iat wholly dependent on wages for its existence rather than the mode
of exploitation actually adopted. Useful insight into the relative
efficiency of these alternatives in exactiong profits may be derived
from a schema offered by Wolpe.
The relative proportion of surplus to necessary labour in
the Capitalist sector where :
The working class is wholly
dependent upon wages for its
reproduction.
(b) The working class derives a
proportion of its means of
reproduction from the Reserve
C
Where S = surplus labour time/product
N = labour time/product necessary for reproduction of labour
power
N = the decreased proportion of labour time/product devoted
to the reproduction by the capitalist sector where a portion
of the necessary means of subsustence is provided by the
Reserve Economy, N". . (4)
The effect of the migrant labour system was to depress African •
wages to a sub-sistence level, the balance being provided by 'sub- V
sistence agriculture1 in the reserves, 'Market forces' were precluded
from causing wage rises, despite chronic shortages of labour, by a
combination of labour repressive techniques, most notably the
'maximum average' system, the recruiting monopsony and servile labour
measures. (5) This coupled with the creation of a market structure
which made it increasingly difficult for Africans to compete effective-
ly with white farmers precluded the re-emergence of signigicant
pluses in the reserves. From this perspective it is possible to
appreciate Bundy's point that :
4. . The terms 'surplus1 and 'necessary1 labour are used in the
conventional Marxist sense. The schema is taken from a revised ver-
sion of the previously cited Wolpe article. See WOLPE H. 'Ideology
and Capitalism in South Africa1 in BENEWICK R, BERKI R,N, PAREKH G :
Knowledge and Belief in^Politi-cs London Allen and Unwin 1973 : p.287.
5. See JOHNSTONE F. 'Class Conflict and Colour Bars in the South
African Mining Industry, 1910-1926' Institute of Commonwealth Studies
Unpublished Seminar Paper Feb. 1970.
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'Within the space of a few years an agricultural revolution,
has taken place in the Transkei chiefly brought about through
the agency of Bantu and White agricultural officers who can
truly be said to have saved the Transkeian soil from dest-
ruction. ' (14)
to the more common :
'The Native Affairs Department has provided about 1 500
boreholes and wells whith pumping plants and 1 000 stock dams,
in addition to 1 680 small dams. Many springs have been fenced,
protected and developed.1 (15)
While it seems generally agreed (16) that the pace of 'stabiliza-
tion' measures was increased quite substantially in the late 1950's
it should not be thought that this in itself constitutes anything
approximating a programme of development. Tomlinson estimated it
would take 245 years to 'stabilize' land in 'scheduled1 areas at the
pace set in the early 1950's. (17) At the time of the 1960 revolt
\the Government had found it necessary to allocate only £3-/5 million
'of the £10 4 million suggested by the Tomlinson Commission. (18)
In analyzing the nature of this 'betterment1 programme, particu-
larly as regards the period 1955-1960, 'stablization1 and 'reclama-
tion1 work must be distinguished. The former indicates measures de-
signed to prevent further erosion, while the latter refers to the
more intensive process of improving the state of the land. The
rapid increase in acreage brought under the 'betterment1 works in the
above period was very much the consequence of emphasizing 'stabiliza-
tion1 rather than 'reclamation1. The Minister of Native Affairs,
Dr. Verwced, discussed the advantages of the new 'betterment' prog-
ramme over the 'old system . . . of spoon feeding1 in Parliament :
"Since 1952 . . . I have tried to adopt a different
course, and that fits in with the institution of Bantu
Authorities in terms of which the responsibility was
thrown on to the Bantu himself. It fits in with his
shouldering of burdens and the result will be that improve-
ments can be brought about on a tremendously larger
scale and thereafter they can be left in the hands of
the Bantu himself, subject to some supervision. That
14. • Digest-oT Sofrt&-Af^feaft^a*^xrs Vol. 9; No. 2 pp. 19^20,
22 Jan. 1962'
15. ROBERTS H^ tt, and COLEMAN K.G. Betterment for the Bantu
issued by the Department of Native Affairs', (n.d.)
16 . See HORRELL Muriel :' The Economic Development of the
1Reserves1. The extent to which the Toinlinson Commission recommend-
ations are being implemented. Johannesburg South African Institute of
Race Relations : Fact Paper No. 3 1959 p.12.
17. Tomlinson Report : op cit p . 75.
18. NIEWENHUYSEN J.P. 'Economic Policy in the Reserves since the
Tomlinson Report', South African Journal of Economics Vol. 32 pp 3-25
1964.
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means colossal savings and great expedition. In this
process, also, care was taken that instead.of what is
is called improvements or reclamation work, certain prin-
ciples of stabilization came into the picture. That
means that instead of intensive soil conservation works
and the improvement of small areas, less intensive and more
extensive work is done in a larger, area by stabilizing
against deterioration.1 (19)
In Eastern Pondoland as in many other areas these schemes met
With much antagonism. While virtually all sources concede this, most
understand this to be reactionary and short-sighted resistance to
essentially progressive change. (20) It is, of course, not unusual
for farmers to be antagonistic towards soil conservation measures.
Professor Thompson, for example has noted of White farmers :
•The farmers were very often unwilling and generally
ill-equipped to make the neccessary adjustments to their
farming methods, and it was to be more than two decades
before the conservatism of farmers could be sufficiently
overcome for Parliament to pass the Soil Conservation (
Act in 1946.! (21)
The case in the reserves, however, appears to justify closer
scrutiny.
The Mpondo argued firstly 'that the cure1 to their poverty 'was
not reduction of stock or fencing, (22) but the allocation of more
land1. (23) The point needs no amplification, the problem of over
utilization of the land obviously has two solutions. While the
stabilization programme involves the establishment of better land :
cattle ratios, it entirely ignore the problem of people : land ratios.
Figures compiled in 1968 of land allocation in Bizana bear witness to
the fact that land stabilization in no way alleviates land shortage.
Over sixty per cent of households were allocated between one and six
acres of land. The average allocation in Bizana was one third the
allotment recommended by the Tomlinson Report. (24)
19. Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 91
14 May, 1956, col. 5301. See also The Senate of the Union of South
Africa Debates 26 May, 1956 cols 3866-3867. The 'stabilization1
programme consists of the division of the land into residential, arable
arid grazing areas; fencing and the reduction of stock.
20 It should be pointed out that such agreement is more a
flection of the narrow range of literature available on rural devel-
opment in South Africa than conclusive evidence of African shortsight-
edness .
21. WILSON M. and THOMPSON L. (eds.) : op cit p.137.
22. Although this point could not be confirmed the implications
of the Minister's statement (see page 5/6) are that fencing is erected
by unpaid labour, which would certainly have created considerable re-
sentment.
23. WILSON M; and THOMPSON L. (eds.) op cit p. 62.
24. Tomlinson Report op cit_pp. 85, 118. See also BOARD Cr-
op cit on this point.
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involved transference of a number of functions of local government from
the magistrates office to that of the Chief. (27) • ' '
Debate on the merits and demerits of the system has, by and large,,
remained on amost general level and some of it is frankly unintell-
igible. (28) In this paper discussion has therefore been related
specifically to the implementation of the system in Pondoland.
The formation of Tribal Authorities in Eastern Pondoland pre-
sumably offered peasants their first opportunity to hear about the
new system. Useful insight into the manner in which the Mpondo were
consulted1 (2?) in 1957 can be derived from a letter written by
T. D. Ramsay, Chief Magistrate of the Transke.ian Territories at the
time, to the Daily News.
Numerous meetings were held in Eastern Pondoland at which Mr.
Ramsay and 'a committee of delegates from each district appointed by
Botha Sigcau, and also by the members of the old General Council,
exhaustively explained to the people' the new system. (30)
According to Mr. Ramsay, not one objection was raised by the Mpondo
at meetings he addressed. (31) Although this does not appear to be
entirely the case with speeches made by other •committee1 members (32)
27. On both these points see HAMMOND - TOOKE W.D. 'The Trans-
keian Council System 1895-1955 : An Appraisal' Journal of African
History, vol.9 No.3, pp.455-477 1968 esp. 464 and 474, and HORRELL M.
'Bantu Authorities and Self Government. An Evaluation and Interim
Report1 Race Relations Journal Vol.26 No.24 April-June 19 59 pp.41-61,
28. For example RAUTENBACH Dr. P.S. ;•Secondary and Tertiary
Development of the Bantu Areas in South Africa1 Journal of Racial
Affairs Vol.12 No . 1 pp.22-35 Oct.1960: P. 27 argues that one of the
main advantages of the Bantu Authorities system is that '.it is educat-
ionally sound in that it evolves from the known to the unknown.1
29. Proclamation 180 op cit, section 10(i) lays down that :'The
Governor-General may, with due regard to Native law and custom and after
consultation with every tribe and community concerned, establish . . a
Bantu tribal or community authority provided that such consultation
shall be deemed to have been effected when each local chief in the
area of such tribe . . . has, upon the direction of the Native Comm-
issioner, held a meeting with the members of such tribe . . . p.4f
30. Letter from Ramsay to the Daily News 6 Sept.1960 p.16 cols 8-9
31. An allegation disputed by New Age 8 Sept.1960 p.l cols 3-5
32. See Regina v. Dilisha Maqutswana and Nineteen others :
Bloemfontein Appeal Court Records 24 3/61 : evidence of Chief Makosonke
Sigcau p. 47, who admitted that the majority of people in his location
were against Bantu Authorities from the start.
• )
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it is quite probable that very few objections were raised at initial
roeetings. It must be borne in mind, however, that these meetings
were administrative lectures. The topic was unfamiliar to the Mpondo
and many weaknesses of the system only became apparent later, once
they experienced the rule of Chiefs.
At no stage, however, in the formation of the Tribal Authority
can the mass ,-of Mpondo peasants be said to have actively participated
In other districts of tho Transkei, general taxpayers elected 27,7
per cent of the councillors for these authorities. In Pondoland,
however, the Paramount appointed 75 per cent and the Native Commiss-
ioner the rest.
TABLE 2 THE FORMATION OF •TRIBAL AUTHORITIES1 IN THE TRANSKEI.
COUNCILLORS APPOINTED BY :
TAXPAYER
PARAMOUNT
NATIVE COMMISSIONER
HEADMEN
Total
IN
PONDOLAND
0%
7.5%
25%
0%
100%
OUT OF
PONDOLAND
27,7%
Q%
13,9%
58,4%
100%
SOURCE: Tribal Authority Schedules published in Government
Gazettes : 1957: No. 5879 p.11; No. 5883 pp.67-70; No. 5900 p. 32;
No. 5904 pp.2-22; No. 5917 pp.39-40; No. 5921 pp. 24-25. 1958 :
No. 6049 p.27 and No.6093 p.15.
The total inability of the system to cater for objection from
below, was well expressed by Chief Makosonke Sigcau, a state witness
at a trial following the murder of one of his headmen. Hearing that
the Mpondo in his area were 'telling the other people untruthful
stories'about Bantu Authorites in 1959, he called a metting ot discuss
the matter. At this meeting :
fI spoke, and after speaking I closed the meeting
. . . I said the Bantu Authorities were passed in Par-
liament and then sent from Pretoria and from Pretoria
> they told the Paramount Chief Bota Sigcau about it .
and I told them that Paramount Chief Bota Sigcau has
called many meetings to explain these Bantu Authorities
to them. It was not thrust upon, them, V (3.3)
'There was a lot of noise1 and the meeting broke up in disorder, •••
The offensive features of the system stem not only:; from the
manner in which it was introduced, but from the power it invested in
the Chiefs. Traditionally there were a number of checks on the power
of the Chief. Of these Monica Wilson has stressed :
33. Regina versus Dilisha Maqutswana and Nineteen Others :
op cit p. 42.
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'the necessity of (the chief) keeping on good terms-with
his people. Hen were an asset and every chief was anxious..:
to benefit by his troubles/ and increase their following.- #*,
by accepting deserters from him.1 (34) •>'•>';
The traditional functions of the chief were more those of con-
census gatherer and ritual leader than administrator. Executive
decisions were made in conjunction with a group of counsellors or
elders. The Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford 1850-1929, for examp
give much evidence to suggest such elders had considerable influence
in policy formulation. (35) These two major checks on the powers
of the chief made it very difficult for a chief to propogate
policy perceived by his subjects to be against their interests.
The Bantu Authorities system substituted for these checks,
measures to safeguard a very different set of interests. As a step
in a politics of domestic colonialism the most prominent ties en
all levels are between the Department of Bantu Administration and
Development and the. various 3antu Authorities, To these must be
coupled concessions to chiefs by way of increased salaries. Para-*-
 r
mount Botha Sigcau for example had his salary increased from f700p,i
to El 500 p.a. (36) on accepting the new system. Whatever the price,
it remained a fact that chiefs could not be relied upon to represent
Mpondo interests to the Government, but rather had turned round in
their stools and were prepared to implement state interests indeper.
ndently of general Mpondo sentiments.
This did not necessarily imply direct conflict between chief
and subject. In western Pondoland, where precisely the same pattern
can be seen, the personal prestige of Paramount Chief Victor Poto
coupled with exercise of far more restraint and tact by his subord-
inate chiefs, largely averted such conflict, (37)
In Eastern Pondoland, Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau had no such
prestige. He was regarded by many Mpondo as a usurper. (38)
34. HUNTER (Wilson) Monica: Reaction to Conquest. Effects of
Contact with Europeans on the Pondo of South Africa, London Oxford ,
University Press 19 36 p.39 3. " V
35. See MACQUARRIE J.W. (ed.) : The Reminiscences of Sir Walter
Stanford : 1850-1929 Vol.2 1885-1929 Cape Town. The Van Riebeck Soc-
iety 1962 p.42, et passin, on. the role of Umlangaso,
36. The Star: 23 Nov. 1960 p.l col.6. See also CHURCHILL
Rhona: White Man's God London Hodder and Stoughton 1962, p.64, who
suggests his salary with perks as being £3 000 p.a.
37. Nevertheless even in Western Pondoland there were outbreaks
of militant opposition: most notably the murder of a Chief and head-
man in district of Port St. Johns, see Daily Despatch 28 Sept.1960
p.l.col.l For evidence on other incidents see Evening Post 6 Oct.
1960 p.3 col.4 ; Rand Daily Mail 14 March 1961 p.3 col.7 and New Age
23 March 1961 p.l cols. 2-4.
38. Botha was the eldest son of the Right Hand wife of Chief
Marelane. His half brother. Nelson, who appears to have been a son
of a minor house attached to the Great House, disputed the claim.
In a most controversial judgment Botha was installed as the Para-
mount. Evidence taken from a letter from the Secretary for Native
Affairs, Mr. H. Rogers, to Advocate D.M. Buchanan, (Nelson's lawyer)
dated Feb. 12 1940 is somewhat suggestive of extra-genealogical
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Although he had been in power since 1938, and had officially been
•reconciled1 (39) with the contesting party, his rule was still
unpopular in 1960. The Mpondo were most determined to have him
removed from the Paramountcy. (40)
Further, the newly acquired powers of the chiefs and headmen
were badly abused in Eastern Pondoland, among other things, chiefs
began charging a fee for allocating land, 'introducing1 their subjects
to the Native Commissioner, and allowing grass to be cut for thatch-
ing. There were suggestions of corruption in the chiefs1 courts and
on school boards. (41)
Such practices were not unheard of before Bantu Authorities
were introduced. Monica Wilson, for example, gives evidence of head-
men imposing a charge for recommending allocation of land to the
Native Commissioner. (42) In a series of articles on the causes of
the Mpondo revolt, Eldred Green argued that :
1a; gift to a person in a position of strength is
not necessarily a bribe. In a purely social context
it may in some circumstances be obligatory.1 (43)
There can be little doubt, however, that the degree of such
corruption increased sharply. While Monica Wilson was able to state
in the 19 30's : 'I never heard any gossip suggesting that bribery
occurred1 in the chiefs1 courts, (44) the position had changed markedly
siderations. Justifying his refusal to consider reopening the issue,
Mr. Rogers argued that fa very strong and able Board of Enquiry1 had
gone into the question 'thoroughly1 and 'were unanimous in their
finding that not only was Botha the rightful heir, but the more suit-
able person to appoint as chief,' Personal files of Professor W.D.
Hammond-Tooke. Uncatalogued.
39- Bantu Informal Publication of the Department of Bantu Administ-
ration and Development Vol. 7 No. 7 July 1960 p.423.
40. See for example CHURCHILL R; op cit. p.64 on this point.
41. See New Age 8 Sept. 1960 p.l cols 3-5; concluding comments
of chairman at Bizana Civic Association Extraordinary Meeting Oct.11
1960; 'memorandum of the Hill Committee to the United Nations Organ-
isation1 (reported in Sunday Times 2 5 Sept. 1960 p.l cols. 7-9;
Report of the Interdepartmental Commission of Enquiry into Distur-
bances in Pondoland reported Daily Despatch 12 Oct. 1960 p.3 cols.3-4
Evening Post 8 Oct.vl960 p.4 col.3 and Regina v. Dilisha Maqutswana
and Nineteen Others : op cit evidence of Masfisini Mahlebe p.24. •
42. HUNTER M. op cit p. 114.
43. Daily News 29 Dec. 1960 p.11 cols 8-9'
44.HUNTER M : op cit p. 426.
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by I960. The scope open to chiefs and headmen for such practices
under the new system was remarkably wide. The case of Chief Stan-
ford Nomagqwatekana, though extreme, bears comment. He was surr-:
ounded by an armed guard of 'stock thieves and criminals1. Elder'S
of the tribe were unable to curtail his association with these
people, not was the tribe able to curtain their activities substant-
ially, despite the fact that 'the tribe as a whole (was) upset1 and
'the peoples' stock were getting finished1. (45)
It is not suggested that chiefs and headmen were the epitome of
corruption, but it is intended to provide some factual background
to substantiate Mpondo grievances in this respect. It was very diff-
icult for peasants to bring charges against such authorities, part-
icularly when these chiefs and headmen were given the power of alloc-
ating' land, and a variety of other functions of local government.
In the absence of traditional checks, there were virtually no avenues
open to limit the abuse of such power. We can therefore, appreciate
ten. frustration of an. Hpondo spokesman who .told the Government
Commission of Inquiry :
'If you wish to see peace and rest in this country ("
take this message with you : We don't want Bantu Authorities.
Take the Paramount Chief and his supporters away1
Take him where he can administer affairs away from us.1 (46)
In concluding this sector, it remains to make explicit the
pattern of rural administration and its concomitant set of mass
grievance.
Through the Bantu Authorities system the Government divested
itself of functions of local government. More importantly, however,
the newly instituted system of local government functioned ideolog-
ically to conceal the paucity of government funds apportioned to the
development of the reserves in general. (47)
The system of education, for example, was classified as a function
of local government. While the state extended a rigid control over
both teacher and syllabus (48), it also provided itself with a just-
ification for transferring a greater degree of the financial burden
on to African taxpayers. (49)
45. Regina v. Barnabas Magqwaiia and 29 others : op cit evidence
of Pantsi Patekile p.19 et passim.
46. Natal Mercury, 26 July I960 p.2 cols. 5-6.
47. 'We begin to treat our adversary's views as ideologies only
when we no longer consider them as calculated lies and when we sense
in his total behaviour an unreliability which we regard as a function
of the social situation in which he finds himself1. MANNHEIM Karl:
Ideology and Utopia an Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge,
London Routledge and Kegan Paul 19 36 p.54 .
48. Evidence on this point can be found in the recommendations
of the Eiselen Commission and Bantu Education Act, No.47 of 1953
(as amended) : see HORRELL M. Bantu Education to 196 8. Johannesburg
South African Institute of Race Relations, Decl 1968, esp. pp.8-22.
49. The basic trend, can be demonstrated by calculations based
on figures from KORRELL M: Bantu Education to 196 8 op cit p,35. The
percentage contribution of Africans to Bantu Education in South Africa
over the period 1955-1969 increases, as follows: 1955-1956: 23'8
cent; 1960-61: 32 per cent; 1965*66: 38,2 per cent and 1968-69^
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A similar case must be made for the economic 'development1 of
the reserves. This can perhaps be most directly illustrated from a
speech by the Minister of Native Affairs justifying the reduction of
the Tomlinson Commission's figure of £27,4 million to be spent on
soil reclamation over ten years to £1 million in the first year. He
argued that the figure recommended by Tomlinson:
•did not take account of the modern method
of working through Bantu Authorities, in terms of which
the people do the work themselves under the supervision
of the Trust.' (50)
This approach to local government in the reserves was not without
repercussions for reserve inhabitants. The effect on African taxation
in the Transkei is instructive. The General tax was increased 75 per
cent to £1 15s. as from 1 January 1959; stock rates on each head of
cattle were introduced into the Transkei on 30 May 1958. The average
Transkeian household probably contributed about £4.10s- to direct
taxes by 1959* Of this sum almost half was imposed during the period
1955-59, This meant that such a household contributed more than four
times the amount of their White, Coloured and Asian counterparts. (51)
It would be misleading to suggest that a 'simple economic interpretation*
of deterioration in the situation of the Mpondo under the impact of
expanding capitalist sectors could account for the outbreak of a revolt.
Barrington Moore, basing his conclusion on numerous case studies of
peasant revolts suggests this as a theory 'it has been necessary to
discard1 with the qualification 'where such deterioration has occurred
on a marked scale, it seems plausible to expect revolutionary out-
breaks. ' (52) Trotsky pinpointed the weakness of oversimplified
explanation in the context of the Russian Revolution:
'In reality the mere existence of privation is
not enough to cause an insurrection; if it were the
masses would be always in revolt.1 (53)
50. South African Parliament ; House of Assembly Debates»
Vol. 94, March 28, 1957, cols. 3749/50. No further 'special amounts'
of this nature were allocated during the next four years; see
NIEWENHUYSEN, J.P. •Economic Policy in the Reserves, since the
Tomlinson Report', op.cit., p*10.
51. All information on taxation used above is derived from
African Taxation Its Relation to African Social Services, Fact Paper
No.4. Johannesburg SAIRR 1960. See esp. pp, 3-4 and 11-12.
52. MOORE, Barrington: Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy Lord and Peasant in the making of the Modern World.
Harmondsworth, Penguin University Books, 1973. ~
53. TROTSKY, Leon, EASTMAN, Max (translator) History of the
Russian Revolution, London Sphere Books 1967, Vol.2, p.12.
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In a direct sense, the cause of revolt lies in a change in >
consciousness of the villagers. The growth of militancy involves•
the development of consciousness whereby the 'bankruptcy of the
social regime1 is in some sense 'conclusively revealed1. (54) Patterns
of social consciousness are not easily reduced to logical responses,
yet this is not to deny that consciousness does not lie 'outside the
real process of history•' 'Consciousness does not have to be intro-
duced into the world by philosophers.1 (55)
The complex set of grievances that emerged in Eastern Pondoland
in the late 1950s has been analysed in terms other than actual Mpondo
perceptions. While the vast majority of these people had no sense of
the totality, they did have an acute awareness of their immediate
interests-
Further, the newly instituted system of local government was seen
clearly to threaten those interests. The reforms instituted through
local administration, coupled with the authoritarian way in which they
were executed, galvanised mass resentment into an intensive critique (
of local authority.
Section 2. ORGANIZATION AND MOBILIZATION
Eric Wolf has commented that peasant revolts of the twentieth
century are not 'simple responses to local problems'* They are,
rather, he argues '... but the parochial reactions to major social
dislocations set in motion by overwhelming societal change1- (56)
It would seem, from analysis of the causes of Mpondo dissatisfaction,
that the revolt must be understood as the complex conjunction of both
•local problems' and 'major social dislocations'-
By mid-1959 mass frustration in Eastern Pondoland culminated in
spontaneous militancy. In Amandengane location in the Bizana District,
for example, a mob descended on a Dutch Reform Mission with the aim
of 'chasing away' the Evangelist and his family - 'because these
people have accepted the Bantu Authorities.' (57) In February 1960 f
the Natal Mercury reported an incident where 'a riotous mob of more
than 100 Native men and women ••• threatened to burn all (traders)
property in the area. All day the Natives inarched along the roads...
hounding' traders and 'telling them to "get out"'.
54. Ibid.
55. LUKACS, Georg; LIVINGSTONE, Rodney (Translator), History
and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, London,
Merlin Press, 1968.
56. WOLF, Eric R.: 'On Peasant Rebellions' in SHANIN Teodor
(ed) Peasants and Peasant Societies Victoria Penguin Books 1971,
pp. 264-276 : p.273.
57. State v. Dilisha Maqutswana and Nineteen Others, op.cit.,
pp.39-42. Natal Mercury, 17 Feb. 1960 p.l. col.9.
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Such activity, however, is more remarkable for its futility than
anything else and can hardly be conceived of as a strategy for
effecting change. In many ways it conforms to what Talcott Parsons
has termed an •expresive orientation where there is no calculated
attempt to confront problems directly*
•The essential point is the primacy of "acting out"
the need disposition itself rather than subordinating
gratification to a goal outside the immediate situation.1 (58)
The characteristic which came to distinguish the Mpondo struggle
from these early sporadic outbursts, however, was the consolidation
of frustration in a disciplined organization. The structural signifi-
cance of this feature cannot be overstressed, for it imparted an
entirely new orientation to the expression of grievance - namely an
instrumental one.
Istvan Meszaros has posed the decisive hurdle for mass movements
to confront most succinctly:
However much one might wish the contrary the question
of political organization cannot be by-passed* The
real issue is therefore the creation of organizational
forms which are adequate to the ••• strategic objectives
considering
a) the socio-historic limitations that objectively
circumscribe the possibilities of action in every
epoch and
b) the necessary limits and distortionary effects
of the institutional form itself. (59)
If the strengths and weaknesses of Mpondo strategy adopted during
the revolt are to be assessed in these terms the pattern of polical
mobilization must be related to the growth of the new structures of
authority that emerged in Eastern Pondoland in I960.
58. PARSONS, T. : The Social System. Gl«ncoe, The Free Press
1951, p.348 cited by FERNANDEZ, J.W. : 'African Religious Movements1
in ROBERTSON, Roland (ed.) : Sociology of Religion, London Penguin
Books, 1969 pp.384-404, p.388"^  The expressive - instrumental continuum
as employed by Fernandez has certain additional elements which are not
applicable here. A characteristic of expressive movements, for example,
is that they 'often spontaneously produce supernatural and visionary
experiences in persons of charismatic qualities,1 (ibid. p.388) of
which there is no trace in the Mpondo struggle. Nevertheless the basic
distinction between a 'realistic and goal-minded* instrumental movement
and an expressive one are useful here and the terms have therefore been
used.
59. MESZAROS, Istvan : 'Contingent and Necessary Class Conscious-
ness' in MESZAROS, I. (ed.) : Aspects of History and Class Conscious-
ness, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1971 pp.89-117 : p.101.
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• In March 1960 they began holding meetings in various locations in
the Bizana district to discuss possible solutions to their difficulties.
These meetings soon became more formalized. Groups of between 10 and
20 men would meet virtually every night at each others Jcraals. From
this a local leadership in each group of kraals emerged, which enabled
larger gatherings to be co-ordinated* (60) By May virtually each
location in Bizana was holding regular political meetings in defiance
of both chiefs and police and despatching representatives to neigh-
bouring locations. The outcome was a hierarchical district organization
that formed and rapidly spread into Lusikisiki and Flagstaff-
Communication between central and peripheral groups depended on
messengers travelling between meetings by foot or on horseback. This
limited centralization of the movement. In each district, however, one
meeting place came to dominate activities in surrounding locations. (61)
Leadership in Flagstaff and Lusikisiki retained considerable autonomy
but came increasingly to rely on Bizana for suggestions. This
relatively centralized organization was initially called the Hill, and
came to dominate the lives of perhaps 180,000 people spread over an
area covering almost 4,000 square kilometres. r
The nature of the organization must be clearly distinguished from
that heralding nineteenth century revolts on the continent. Traditional
structures of mobilization centering around the chief did not occur
naturally* Further, there was notable absence of mystic leadership of
the type discussed, for example, by T.O. Ranger in his analysis of the
mobilization of Shona and Matebele impi in the 1896-1897 Southern
Rhodesian uprisings. (62) Although Mpondo meetings like the cult
centres relied on inaccessible venues for secrecy, there was nothing in
the Hill's nature that could be construed as esoteric. Meetings were
public and all were encouraged to attend and contribute to the process
of decision-making. While a hierarchical leadership structure developed,
leaders owed their authority neither to contact with Mwari, nor to
traditional status but to the fact that their resourcefulness and clear
sightedness were generally accepted.
The nature of the Hill, was nevertheless, in some ways paradoxical.
The bulk of its activities were directed against traditional power
holders* The contempt in which chiefs, particularly the Paramount chiefs-
were held is apparent from even the most cursory glance at the material V
available. Furthermore the goals articulated by Hill spokesmen could
not possibly be defined 'as a looking back, a desire to return to old
customs and institutions.• (63)
60. Interview with Mr. M.W. NGZIKI - a reporter who covered the
revolt for the Evening Post - on 3 July 1973.
61. Viz. Ngquza Hill in Lusikisiki; Nklovu Hill in Bizana; and
Ngqindilili Hill in Flagstaff.
62. RANGER, T.O. : Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, London, Heinemann
1967, pp.142-161 and 200-226 et passim. Compare for example RANGER, T.O.
ibid, pp.145-146 with Sunday Times, 27 Nov*1960, p.3, cols. 2-4.
63. WILLIS, J.R. : 'Jihad Fi Sabil Allah : Its doctrinal basis in
Islam and some aspects of its evolution in Nineteenth Century West Africa*
Journal of African History, Vol.8, No.3 1967 pp.395-415; p.395 defines
revivalism in these terms. In this loose sense a revivalist orientation
is often attributed to rural resistance in Africa. The small holders
are seen as struggling to disentangle themselves from their involvement
with the wider economy, and therefore glorifying a former age when they
were more isolated communities.
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In July 1960 for example, 'a gaunt and grey-haired old man1
informed the Van Heerden Commission:
'When the vote was taken away from us the Bantu
people were not allowed to sit side by side with the
white man in Parliament. This unrest has come to stay
as long as the Bantu people have no representative in
Parliament to voice their grievances*1 (64)
Yet Wolf's comment that the smallholders are 'the main bearers of
peasant tradition1, (65) is just as applicable to the Mpondo as to
other peasant societies. The Hill operated very much within the
framework of traditional norms. The resultant combination of traditional
and acculturated roles can be illustrated on a ritual level. The
following account of a Hill Meeting held in Lusikisiki in about May 1960
was given in court by a police informer.
The headman of the location had been converted to the movement,
and people assembled at his kraal before sunrise.
) 'At the headman's kraal I found a big pot with
liquid medicine. We all had to put our fingers in
the water and suck the medicine and another person
was making crosses and incisions on our foreheads ...
It was said we should first take this medicine
because we are going to Ngquza Hill*' (66)
They assembled at Ngquza Hill at sunrise, together with aany others
from various locations. There, among other things, they were addressed
by a Mpondo who had come 'from Ndlovu Hill1 in Bizana. He impressed
upon them the need for unity and 'said we should act as decided upon at
Ndlovu Hill'. (67)
Inter-district organization had barely begun in May 1960, and
popular leaders from Bizana would presumably not have been well known
in Lusikisiki. The use of traditional ritual as a means of conferring
legitimacy on the new organization is not without significance. Never-
theless it is probable such rites were employed only rarely. There
. does not appear to be any other evidence in this vein. More commonly
) meetinqs were opened with a prayer. In fact of the five central
leaders of the revolt, two-Mbambeni Madikizela and Nkosana Mbodla - had
been lay preachers. Occasionally the pulpit was utilized as an oppor-
tunity to encourage people to attend meetings of the Hill. Thus the
day before Chief Vakuibambe Sigcau was killed 'Mzozoyana (a lay preacher)
in church reminded the people again that they have to go to Ngquindilili
Hill*. (68)
64. Natal Mercury : 26 July 1960 p.l col.7. The date is signifi-
cant, as it was before contact with 'outside agitators1 was established
and thus goes some way to damn the official explanation that the revolt
was entirely a local issue that could have been settled through estab-
lished channels had the Mpondo not been manipulated.
65. WOLF, E. : 'On Peasant Rebellions1 : op.cit.t p.269.
66. State v. Kaka Rubele and 35 others : Grahamstown Appeal Court
Records 366/61 : evidence of Vovadliwe Kuseni pp. 1-2; see also pp.22,63.
67. Ibid., p.4.
68. Regina v. Mkatazo Mvonqana and 29 others; Bloemfontein Appeal
Court Records 191/61, evidence of Mabona Caza p.100. See also evidence
of Dodd Mzozoyana esp. p.102.
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to leave unmolested before Vakuibambe and the two indunas were killed.
(75). Such disturbances led to much misconceived comment. Supreme
court records abound with evidence suggesting:
•The basis of the whole unlawful organization
was intimidation. They had to intimade the
residents in order to get their co-operation. The
message or the religion brought to the people is ...
"those who are not with us are against us" and they
must be liquidated, their kraals must be burned and
they must be killed.1 (76)
Court records are, however, plainly misleading in this respect.
The total number of murders resulting from the revolt was about
twenty-two. Of these most were headmen, chiefs, or their bodyguards.
The remaining five victims were police informers. (77) Some alternative
speculations must be suggested on the relationship between political
organization and violence at this point if a more adequate understanding
of the revolt is to be achieved.
*• Any political organization hoping to exercise control requires
some means of regulating social behaviour. Such means invariably
involve the use of violence or at least the threat thereof. In con-
formity with the work of S.I* Benn and R.S. Peters this may be termed
•power1* (78) While ability to exercise power is perhaps necessary
for the maintenance of any system of social regulations it is not a
sufficient condition in itself. Some form of legitimacy is required.
Writings on the nature of legitimacy tend to lie in the shadow of
Max Weber's exposition, and it is sufficient merely to adopt his
formulation of the concept of authority. (79) Given these two concepts
the conclusion reached by Benn and Peters would seem to follow:
•It is only when a system of authority breaks
down or a given individual loses his authority that
there must be recourse to power if conformity is to
be ensured.• (80)
The 'system of authority1 very clearly broke down in Pondoland.
Tt was to a greater or lesser extent replaced by a new system of
1
 .thority. Stress on the coercive nature of the Hill is misleading
76. State v. Kekani Gudlulwayo and one other, Bloemfontein Appeal
Court Records 27/1962 : evidence of Mr. J.J. Swartz, p.196.
77. Figures were compiled from court records and newspapers.
Official figures differ somewhat. In reply to a question put in
Parliament, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development,
Mr. De Wet Nel, said that two chiefs, two sub-headmen, four 'counsellors1
and seventeen others 'were murdered by their fellow Bantu.• Union of
South Africa House of Assembly Debates, Vol.106, col.438, 31 Jan.1961.
78. BENN, S.I. and PETERS, R.S.: Social Principles and the
Democratic State« London, Allen and Unwin 1959, esp. Part 1.
79. See WEBER, Max; PARSONS, Talcott (ed.): The Theory of Social
and Economic Organization. New York, The Free Press 1964, esp. Part III.
80. BENN. S.I. and PETERS, R.S., op.cit.. p.21.
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Georg Simmel has commented:
•If a mass rebels against an authority, the
authority gains an immediate advantage if it succeeds
in causing the mass to choose representatives who are
to lead the negotiations. At least, the overwhelming
smashing onslaught of mass, as such, is broken in this
fashion; for the moment, the mass is checked by its
own leaders in a way in which the authority itself
can no longer succeed* The mass leaders exert the
formal function of the authority and thus prepare
for the pre-entrance of the authority into its
dominating position.1 (87)
The local leadership, however, was committed to initiating campaign,
against Bantu Authorities and was sufficiently astute to take the
initiative where possible. For example, in May a spokesman was sent
from a Hill meeting to telephone the Bizana Magistrate, Mr. E. Warren,
in connection with a message 'to the Government complaining that tribal
Bantu Authorities should be withdrawn'• The Mpondo had previously
asked the magistrate to forward their complaint to the relevant
authority, and had grown wary at the lack of response this had evoked.
Rather than send a delegation to the magistrate's office, the meeting
insisted that the magistrate come to the Hill and explain whether he
had indeed passed on the message. (88)
While the administration could afford to overlook such incidents
it could hardly ignore the systematic destruction of the Bantu
Authorities. In June it was decided to put an end to the meetings by
force.
The police struck at Ngquza Hill on 6 June 1960. Flagstaff Mpondo
had been holding regular meetings at the foot of the Hill, and did not
anticipate police intervention:
'... the Police had for three weeks been watching
their meetings and had neither taken action nor given
warning that action would be taken. So the men moved
into the valley with a false sense of security, though r
many knew that eighteen police vehicles containing one ^
hundred policemen had taken up a position three miles
away at 9 a.m.• (89)
Soon after midday, when perhaps 400 Mpondo had gathered, a
helicopter and two Harvard aircraft flew over the meeting and dropped
tear-gas bombs into the crowd. The police, armed with revolvers and
sten-guns, took up positions on the surrounding hillside. As the
police descended Africans hoisted a white flag. The ensuing encounter
was described by an Mpondo:
87. WOLFF, Kurt H., The Sociology of Georq Simmel, Glencoe,
The Free Press, 1950, pp.281-282 - cited by KUPER, Leo. An African
Bourgeoisie Race Class and Politics in South Africa. New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1965, p.31.
88. Natal Mercury, 19 Aug. 1960, p.lf col.6-7. - Report from
the first trial of Mbambeni Madikizela and four other central Hill
leaders - Theophilus Tshangela, Mpini Ndlela, Maveni Ntshangase and
Nkosana Mbodla-
89. CHURCHILL, Rhona: op.cit., p.64.
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•The spot was in flames. Over 200 police well-
armed combed the bush, shooting everyone they came
across. Those who tried to surrender themselves
were without mercy shot. The women who made war-
cries were thrashed, kicked and assaulted in the
huts. The arrested were taken to the charge office.1 (90)
Police alleged that the Mpondo had fired first, and that they had
retaliated by way of self-defence. Eleven Mpondo were killed and 13
seriously wounded. Subsequent post-mortems revealed that some were
shot in the back as they fled. No police were injured in any way and
the attack was followed by arrests. The wounded were left to struggle
six miles to Holy Cross Mission Hospital or to hide in the hills. The
local magistrate refused even to hold an inquest into the shootings. (91)
The history of rural resistance in South Africa is studded with
such incidents. Local tragedies at Bulhoek, Bondelswarts, Witzieshoek,
Zeerust, Sekhukuneland and other areas were all fundamentally similar.
(92) Kuper has commented:
j 'The police and the Government hold the initiative
••• They have certainly improved the machinery for
domination ...
And yet official action has the same stereo-typed
quality as the violence of the African masses. Pre-
sumably over the long period of contact, well tested
techniques for the handling of Africans have crystallized
into traditions and rituals of domination, to which the
single-minded application of the doctrines of apartheid
lends a sacred rigidity. Move and countermove are
highly predictable, following a few set patterns.' (93)
Stereotyped state violence was, however, a miscalculation in this
instance. The incident went some way to undermining the self-confidence
and self-righteousness of local magistrates. The hasty exercise of
power placed the Lusikisiki magistrate, for example, in the unenviable
position of having to justify his flaunting of legal procedure with
regard to the shootings. (94) Rather than passifying the movement it
J
90. Private letter cited by DRAPER, Miss M.H., op.cit., p.3.
91. This account is based mainly on DRAPER, Miss M.H., op.cit.,
pp.2-3; HORRELL, Muriel. Annual Survey of Race Relations 1959-1960.
Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations 1961, pp.41-42;
CHURCHILL, Rhona, op.cit.. pp.62-66; Nstal Mercury, 9 June 1960, p.2,
cols.4-6; Sunday Tribune, 12 June 1960, p.2, col.4; Sunday Timest
12 June 1960, p.15, cols.1-3; Daily News, 14 June 1960, p.10, cols.6-7;
Contact, 2 July 1960, p.3, cols.1-5 and an interview with the priest
in charge of Holy Cross Mission Hospital at the time, Father Vaughan-
Jones, on 1 Dec. 1973.
92. cf. KUPER, Leo. op.cit., p.27.
93. Ibid., p.14.
94. The role of the legalistic niceties of Apartheid is well
brought out by ADAM, Heribert. op.cit., see esp.pp.65-67 where he
differentiates between fascist models of dictatorship and South African
modes of domination.
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simply inflamed feelings. Resistance became more widespread and the
campaign against Bantu Authorities was intensified. (95)
By July or August it would appear that Bantu Authorities had
virtually ceased to function in Bizana, and half of Lusikisiki and
Flagstaff* It is difficult to pinpoint dates precisely, but some
indication of the extent of rebel control can be gathered from the
position of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner at Bizana. (96)
Earlier he had been able to administer the area through the
government-appointed authorities, but by the end of August he was
reported to have requested a mass meeting at Ndlovu Hill to:
•(1) Discuss the return of Government- appointed
chiefs who have fled the area;
(2) Propose tribesmen to act as chiefs in the
places of those now in refuge;
(3) Recommend representatives for appointment
as enumerators in the forthcoming population census,1 (97)
The meeting refused to discuss the first two questions and reject
the third. The report continued:
•Responsible tribesmen told me that even if they
were to discuss the question of appointing acting
chiefs, not a single member among them would be
prepared to accept the position. I was told, "Chiefs
who have fled from the area are no longer welcome
here. The Government should look after them111. (98)
This is not to suggest that the Magistrates Office declined in
significance. In a sense Bantu Commissioners still determined the pace
of events. Arrests were made an an increasing number of peasants found
themselves standing trial for 'addressing illegal meetings1, arson and
occasionally even murder. The difficulties thus incurred by the rebels
are adequately summarized In the Xhosa expression;
'Ngaphandle kwegqwetha usisisulu setilongo1
(•The surest way of going to jail is to appear in
court without a lawyer.')
Further, the magistrates' court often set bail at very high
figures - £100 in cash in most cases. (99) The Hill relied initially
on a nominal membership fee paid by ordinary peasants, to meet the cost
of litigation. By July this was proving insufficient and the movement
was facing danger of bankruptcy. The dampening effect on morale of
scores of Mpondo jailed without prospects of defense by attorneys
forced the leadership to react.
95. 29 huts were razed in the two weeks following the shootings;
Natal Mercury, 21 June 1960, p.l, cols.1-3.
96. The functions of District Magistrate and Bantu Commissioner
were performed by a single individual. Insofar as possible, such en
individual is referred to as magistrate in the context of his legal
duties, aid Bantu Commissioner in the context of administrative duties.
97. Daily News. 29 Aug. 1960, p.3, cols.1-2.
98. Ibid.
99. Interview with Father Vaughan-Jones. 1 Dec* 1973.
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Significantly, however, the Hill retained its systemic character.
Far from being drawn into desparate activity its moves remained highly
unpredictable from the point of view of the administration. The rebel
organization used its increased support to develop techniques of passive
resistance. Initiative was thereby gradually wrested from the
magistrates office; he became progressively less able to determine
the areas of conflict. The Hill turned to two other prospective sources
of aid, traders and the Urban Tribal Associations, particularly in
Durban and Margate. It is suggested that this move must be understood
in part as the result of state pressure. It must at any rate be
regarded as a significant step in the growth of the movement.
The traders were a well-organized and articulate elite. Their organ
was the Civic Association and their access power on a local level was
guaranteed not only by the prevailing myths inherent in colonial
administration, but by their ability to formulate and articulate group
interests.
In its dealings with traders, the Hill leadership evolved a
\trategy based on three assumptions, which may be briefly summarised
Js follows:
1. They presumed that traders as a group could help them in two
ways - firstly by giving them money and the use of lorries (100) and
secondly by taking up their grievances with the Department of Bantu
Administration and Development*
2. They believed it to be within their power to pressurise traders
into fulfilling these roles.
3. They hoped that, if the traders pressed their case, the
government would yield.
Initially the Hill's effort was directed at individual traders
who for one reason or another stood out as particularly antagonistic
to their struggle. One trader in the Flagstaff district for example
was boycotted in June, and was forced to close down his shop. The
Mpondo were apparently incensed by the appearance of the trader's son
\n any army uniform. He had returned home on leave during his training
Very soon after the Ngquza Hill tragedy.
Even at this stage, it is interesting to correlate financial
pressures on the Mpondo with their demands on traders. On the 31 Aug.
1960 for example four Mpondo were found guilty on an arson charge 'in
protest against Bantu Authorities.1 They were remanded on 6 September
for sentence and were allowed bail of £100 each. (101) A day later the
Daily News carried the following report:
•One trader, Mr. Gert van Niekerk, told me today
that he has £5,000 worth of stock in his store ...
but not one customer. He was forced to close down
several weeks ago but he is hopeful that the boycott
will be called off shortly. Mr. van Niekerk said that
tribesmen in his area were holding a meeting today to
decide whether to remove his store from the "boycott
list". "Certain tribesmen demanded that I should pay
£100 to end the boycott but I refused" he said.' (102)
100. cf. pp.57-58
101. Daily News: 31 Aug.1960, p.l, col.l.
102. Daily News: 1 Sept.1960, p.3, cols.5-6.
- 26 -
Boycotts on traders were not unknown in Pondoland though they
were extremely isolated cases. Monica Wilson, writing in 1936 mentions
that a store was boycotted on the orders of the Paramount Chief fifteen
years previously. (103) By mid-August 1960 three stores in the
Flagstaff district and one in the LusikisiJci district were being
boycotted. (104) That this was not discussed by the Bizana Civic
Association is indicative of traders1 belief that boycotting was
unlikely to affect them as a class. This point of view was by no means
naive. Given the poverty of the Mpondo it was unthinkable that they
should cut themselves off from the few stores where it was possible
to buy grain. <105) Boycotting even a single store in a district
involved hundreds of people committing themselves to walking perhaps
five or six miles to the next. It was then the mark of a highly
organized popular movement that the Flagstaff Hill Committee succeeded
in boycotting three stores simultaneously.
Individually, traders appreciated, by September, that they were
far more vulnerable. On hearing that the Hill committee was boycotting
the census on 6 September 1960 only one trader in Bizana volunteered
to act as an enumerator. Even he abandoned the attempt 'after receivin
warnings from "friendly Pondos" that it was dangerous to do so.' (106)
The extent of Mpondo power over the individual trader is clearly
demonstrated by the attempt of a trader, Keith Wicks, to have the
boycott of his store lifted. He sent messages to the Hill seeking an
interview to discuss the situation.
•I arrived with eight Pondo representatives from
the area in which my store is. We left my vehicle and
walked a mile up the hill. At the top, in a great
circle sat 4,000 Pondos. I waited on the fringe of
the circle, until it was my turn to appear before
"The Hill".
Then I was called to the centre of the circle.
I had my hands in my pockets. One tribesman rose and
said:
"Even a White man must take his hands from his
pockets when he comes here."
Xhey asked me many questions and eventually told
me to await their judgement in my car. After the
three hour wait in the rain, Pondos came to tell me
"You may open your store." (107)
103. HUNTER, Monica: op.cit., p.426.
104. Daily Despatch : 2 Sept. 1960, p.lf col.l.
105. New crops are planted in about September and while 'early
patches' of sorgum and of maize ripen in December, the main crop of
dry grain, maize and millet is harvested only in April, May and June.
HUNTER, Monica : op.cit., p.110. As might be expected October to
January are thus peak months for traders' sales of grain. See
HAINES, E.S., op.cit.. pp.206-207.
106. Daily Despatch, 8 Sept. 1960, p.13, cols. 1-2.
107. Rand Daily Mail. 30 Nov. 1960, p.lt cols.4-6.
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The Mpondo agreed to lift the boycott on the understanding that
he would 'prove himself a friend.1 Thereafter he was required to
transport them to and from meetings - which he did. (108)
By October, however, the force of Mpondo militancy was felt strongly
by all traders. On 11 October 1960 the Bizana Civic Association held
an Extraordinary Meeting, Mr. V. Leibbrandt, Chief Magistrate of the
Transkei, read out the findings of the Government Commission of Inquiry
and the meeting was then opened for discussion. The frustration and
anxiety of the group was raised by one trader.
•Mr. Human : What is going to be done about the intimid-
ation, blackmail, and threats to close trading stations
down. Traders had been living under these threats for months.
They had either to comply or have their stations ctbosed
down. Last time you were here you told us that the traders
were in no way involved.
Mr. Leibbrandt : Is your question on b«half of all
traders?
Mr. Human : It is on behalf of one section, all of
whom are not here tonight as they were afraid to come in.
While Mr. Leibbrandt was safe in Umtata we were sitting
on a boiling kettle which was getting hotter and hotter.
Mr. Leibbrandt : An adequate police force was on hand
for defence ...» (109)
This final reply, of course, misses the point* While it was true
that the police force was able to defend the village against impi
armed with assegais and knobkerries, the Mpondo did not provide such a
crude threat. They were well aware that traders had just bought
Christmas stocks and that they were even more vulnerable than otherwise
in the face of boycotts. (110)
The transition in the sentiments expressed in the BCA over the
period May to October 1960 suggests strongly that Mpondo strategy was
well-founded* By the end of October they had cut back the neutral
ground surrounding the position of the traders, forcing them to enter
the conflict. There were undoubtedly some traders who would have
braved the intimidation at all costs. Others, however, were obviously
Awavering. Though it is impossible, on the evidence collected, to
^prove that traders secretly made contributions to the SAnti-Bantu
Authorities Fund1 for example, (111) there are certain features of
108. Interview with Kieth Wicks. 15 fluly 1973.
109. Minutes of BCA Extraordinary Meeting 11 Oct. 1960.
110. In his explanation of the Bizana boycott a Hill spokesman
argued precisely this point. He was reported by the Evening Post 3 Nov.
1960 p.l col.l as saying : 'The traders had bought stocks for Christmas.
If the boycott succeeded these stocks would not be sold. •
111. With the exception of a single minor case mentioned by the
Sunday Times 6 Nov. 1960 p.12 cols.1-3. The date, however, being only a
few days after the boycott of Bizana was begun, is not without interest.
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developments in November 1960 that suggest the likelihood of such activity.
To bring out these elements more clearly the significance of some events must
first be discussed.
The central leadership of the revolt had been granted leave to appeal against
an earlier conviction, and were granted bail. Despite the fact that not a single
person had estreated bail, their bail was withdrawn on the grounds that they 'might
take it out on informers' or might flee 'to Ghana or somewhere else.1 (112)
They were given a week to hand themselves over fur arrest. In that week they held
a number of crucial meetings. The rebels were greatly incensed by this move of the
court. In addition feelings ran particularly high as a result of the obvious
insensitivity of the Van Heerden Commission's findings. (113) The leadership
correctly inferred that this resentment could be channeled into the most far-reaching
pressures on traders.
On 1 November, almost 3 000 peasants followed their leaders into Bizana
to witness their arrest. The following day only a handful of Mpondo entered the
village, and residents awakened to the fact that the entire village was being
boycotted.
A picket was set up on the outstkirts of the village. Ten local buses that
usually carried scores of people to and from the village each day 'did not appear.'(11
Government controlled buses carried only a handful of passengers.
There were at the time between 80 000 and 100 000 Mpondo residents in the Bizana
district. (115) Presuming that the distribution of trading stores roughly
reflects the distribution of trade, and accounting for the fact that about 60 per
cent of adult males were probably on mines and white-owned farms at the time, this
would imply that a population of 40 000 to 50 000 commonly relied on the village
trade (116). For most of these the boycott involved walking or riding an
additional five miles to a district trader outside the village. The organisation
of such a boycott is a very clear Indication of the capacity of the Hill in Bizana
to mobilize significant support for the tasks it undertook.
The consolidation and structuring of Mpondo grievances altered the distribution
of power markedly in Eastern Pondoland over the period considered. The revolt
gathered its own momentum, forcing the traditional elite to abandon its position,
and disorientating the petty bourgeoisie. Its success lay in its ability to r
channel spontaneous mass resentment into disciplined systemic action In increasing ^
numbers of locations.
During the second week of the boycott some traders attempted to organize the
temporary closing of all stores. They argued that the Mpondo would then be
forced to discontinue their action or starve. Significantly they did not get
even as far as calling a meeting of the BCA to discuss their proposal. (117)
It would seem that most traders refused to contemplate any move which might further
antagonise the Mpondo. In retrospect, it is quite probable that such action'
would have led to the ransacking of stores rather than to the intended effect. (118)
112. Evening Post 9 Nov. 1960. p.l. col.5
113. See Chapter 4.
114. Daily News 2 Nov. 1960 p.l. cols. 2-3
115. Since the Mpondo boycotted the 1960 census it is not possible to be very
accurate.
116. A similar figure is reached by calculating the maximum individual spending per
spending day. (It was estimated by newspapers that Bizana lost £1 000 per
day. See Rand Daily Mail 9 Nov. p.l col.2)
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Besides this abortive suggestion, the only organized response by Bizana
residents was a deputation to the Chief Magistrate, Mr. Leibbrandt, on the 18
November, I960. (119) The deputation was clearly to press the administration
to caac their position by yielding to the Mpondo, at least temporarily.
In the same breath it must be mentioned that the boycott underlined the
limit of their achievement. A meeting of 12,000 people on 5th November 1960
took a decision to extend the boycott to Flagstaff, Lusikisiki, Tabankulu
and Mount Ayliff (118). This they were not able to do. Likewise the meeting's
decision to boycott recruits for mines and sugar estates was ineffective.
Numerous speculations may be offered as to the possibility of boycotting mines in
favour of sugar estates or vice versa - certainly it must be acknowledged that
with time they would have forced traders to stop recruiting by threat of boycotting
Such approach would however ignore the most obvious constraint, namely the threat
of police and army.
By November, there were an estimated 200 police reinforcements in the three
villages of Bizana, Flagstaff and Lusikisiki. (119) Though they did not know
it, orders banishing, 3 of 5 members of the central executive - Madikizela, Nkosana
'. Mbodla and Theophilus Tshangela had been signed in October 1960. (120)
On 30 November I960 a partial state of emergency was proclaimed in Eastern
Pondoland. (121) Entry into the area was rigidly controlled. It became
illegal to organise or take part in any organised boycott. Power to order the
removal of any African 'without prior notice' from one district to another was
granted to the Paramount Chief. The South African Police force was empowered to
'render assistance including the application for force1 to Bantu Authorities, and
Magistrates. 'No civil action whatsoever in respect of any cause of action ...
in connection with the operation of these regulations shall be capable of being
Instituted against the State.
Under the protection of these regulations the police began detaining large numbers
of people. (122). On 11 December 1960 the Sunday Express reported that units of the
Mobile Watch, 'the most intensively trained fighting force1 in the South
African Defence Force was being sent to Pondoland. (123) On 14 December
they were deployed to Bizana, Flagstaff and Lusikisiki and Proclamation R.400 was
amended to allow for the detention and interrogation of Mpondo suspected of having
committed, or intending to commit, an offence. (124) Two days later there was
'talk of the jails being crammed with prisoners and army vehicles being used to take
some of them to Matatieie, Kokstad and even Marit2burg. (125) In January 1961 it
was officially announced that 4 769 Africans, 2 whites and 2 of 'other races' had
been arrested. (126)
Assuming (i) Real Incomes were approximately 5 per cent greater than in 1968 (Johann
MAREE in "The Underutilization of Labour in the Ciskei and Transkei" unpublished
seminar paper presented for discussion at the Institute of African Studies, 4 June
1973, p.13 gives this figure as R2O,73 at 1968 prices).
(ii) 2 per cent p.a. increase in prices of the period 1960-1968.
(Hi) an average of six people per family.
(iv) 70 per cent of migrants' wages were remitted to the reserve,
(v) 30 per cent of the resident population of Bizana was outside the district
at the time.
(vi) slightly over half the total income per family was In cash,
(vii) all Mpondo money was spent at traders except for taxes. This would
give a very conservative estimate of 36 000 to 40 000 Mpondo directly
affected by the boycott.
117. Sunday Times 6 Nov. 1960 p. 12 cols. 1-3
118. Evening Post 8 Nov. I960 p.3 cols. 4.
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The effect on the Mpondo revolt was the complete destruction of all unofficial
activity. The boycott of Blzana continued until 5 January, but the onslaught of
police activity and army activity was so overwhelming that the movement ground to
a standstill.
By the end of February 1961 the Rand Daily Mail reported:
'In the Lusikisiki district hundreds of tribesmen had pledged their support of
Chief Botha Sigcau. Practically all able-bodied men in six locations had
sought the Paramount Chief's pardon.* (127)
This more than any other humiliation symbolized the collapse of resistance.
Though this paper is in many ways incomplete, it does I hope, throw into
relief some much neglected aspects of South African history. The Mpondo revolt is
remarkable both for its duration and its sytemic orientation. During the nine months
of its activities the Hill demonstrated an ability to manipulate local elites
effectively. Further, it succeeded in defining a context for political conflict
that rendered ineffectual the subtleties of rural domination. The heightened
level of Mpondo political consciousness has a significance that extends far beyond )
the revolt itself, (and this paper). It is no coincidence, for example, that
the first party formed to contest the 1963 election in the Transkei was the
Eastern Pondoland Peoples Party. Further it is not surprising that despite Government
harrassment this party captured seven of eight possible seats in the area.
119 _Sunday Times 27 Nov. I960, p.l, col.10
120. The orders were not served on them until May 1962, as they were
sentenced to 18 months in Jail in the interim period. Natal Mercury
3 May 1962. p.l col.3-4
121. State of Emergency proclaimed in terms of Government Gazette Extraordinary
No. 6582, 30 Nov. i960. Proc. No. R.400 pp.1-8.
122. Sunday Times. 4 Dec. 1960. p.3. cols. 7-9
123. Sunday Express. 4 Dec. 1960 p.l cols, 1-2
124. Government Gazette No. 6594 Proc. R.413 Regulation 19.
125. Rand Daily Mail 16 Dec. 1960 p.22, col.
126. House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 99, col. 226
127. Rand Daily Mail. 28 Feb. 1961. p.2 col.2-3.
